despite the u.s. achievements, in june 1942 by midway isle: both a successful defense repelling the invaders and the significant loss of FOUR major jap warplane carriers named akagi kaga hiryu soryu, which sank on june 4 and 5, still the japanese had PLENTY of other ships.
june 1942 jap invaded attu in aleutian isle chain. "later" they moved eastward toward alaska landing on kiska so wrote a history book but see below.
this surprise did not match the jap goal of a "safety zone" which was the excuse to spread south from caroline to new gini. it did match the emperors greed for a vast isle empire taking more isles and claiming the sea between attu and the home isle of the fuji m.r. advancing northeast took more isles and extended the sea empire oops. almost to the date line 177 east but not beyond the imaginary line opposite london in briton.
the u.s. strategic need was to push the jap attackers away from alaska that u.s. had purchased from russian empire. the claim aletutian is "far" 574 miles from peninsula does not justify sending to the "more remote" solomon which anyway was helping the brits in solomon which was a BRITISH colony, not only not american need but also in distance much further from hawaii than attu from mainland. in attu the u.s. was unprepared. the japanese "distraction" to threaten alaska justified the u.s. prioritizing there.
the u.s. could send its warplane carriers NORTH from midway to assist the swift crushing of japanese shipping there also bombing the occupied places while the land forces advanced westward... but dumb dem dnc put the u.s. LAST only after helping the bad british colonialism. he was not even "helping the weak natives" in solomon isle chain, against japan which would not be justified when japs were nearing alaska.
before the march '43 naval battle where u.s. failed to prevent forces to strengthen the jap occupation what was the story?
STORY
june 1942 jap invaded attu in aleutian isle chain... history books preserved "june 12" nope, actually the problem was earlier than historians wrote.
u.s. Naval meteorological outposts, Naval Weather Detachment, were maintained on Attu and Kiska. the isles had been "occupied" by u.s. not empty. attu was at the west end of the aleutian chain. the U.S. maintained a 10-man Naval Weather Detachment on Kiska, however since the 7th june, "No weather reports from Attu and Kiska had been received." this could serve as a warning that some problem occurred.
the apt response would be to try and contact them and send a scout plane from the alaskan defense force to see the enemy took it on june 7! gasp. not 12. no wonder this BLUNDER was CLASSIFIED SECRET UNTIL 1945 GASP.
the u.s. WAITED for months! landing on Adak, 30 August 1942 delaying all june, july and all august just to get to adak still east from kiska. the SAME as landed in adak and amch' could REUSE the same experienced amphibious troops and vehicles to grab isles near kiska as they added warplanes in june! 1942, and the experienced amphibious troops with carrier warplanes could take kiska before august! no excuses of lack of landing vehicles as shown by adak and amch'.
Invasion of Attu, May 1943 was nearly a year of waiting and occupation since june 7 instead of using forces for u.s. strategic needs before british colonialism. in fact they later learned it had been "captured on the sixth" but sent messages until 7 as above. only one guy survived the shooting and fled until surrendered to japs two months later. he coulda been rescued by prompt action when japs silenced them to prevent informing their arrival.
during august 1942 The Japanese had not been idle, in August they had reinforced Kiska with 1,000 Marines and 500 civilian laborers that would kill more Americans the following august due to the dumb dem dnc delay. if not for dumb dem delay could go promptly!! before strengthened these thousand additional, instead with easier battles.
what did they know at the time?
A search plane reported in june 1942, one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, one destroyer, and six transports in Kiska Harbor. that was east from attu. the alaska defense should send a "scout" on the 8 when the usual report did not come they would have found the heavy cruiser and realized the need sooner.
u.s. warplanes on the midway carriers could smother this small fleet if they had aptly sent the carrier force to these warships of which they KNEW.
the jap carriers managed to move from india to caroline and solomon in one month in may 1942 so how can u.s. delay more than one month less distance? the scout was 4 days late but even informed on june 11 dumb dem dnc "commander in chief" prioritized brit colonialism over u.s. strategic needs.
he waited for japan to strengthen by sending more cruisers and land forces, as above a thousand more with supplies before even BEGINNING to send u.s. troops westward.
long delay to long delay the u.s. moved forces west. to adak as above but delayed three months until end august. U.S. forces prepared Adak, 30 August 1942. despite KNOWING amch' was empty by plane scout and could PRACTICE amphibious again swiftly to take amch' after one night's sleep in ship, Still dumb dem waited FOUR more months until 12 January 1943 to prepare the Amchitka isle about midway between adak and occupied kiska. the commander in chief was the dumb dem dnc who failed to push the japs away from alaska for many months and allowing japs to strengthen in a way that would cause
***more american deaths
when they would liberate kiska and attu. even amch was far from kiska as above middle but need to immediately control empty amch and reuse vehicles to block the jap advance and before august battle for kiska and attu which were nearer than british solomon.
the next major event, after am' was a naval battle west from attu. it only showed that u.s. was unprepared despite its heavy cruiser which had spent time on target practice but could not prevent the reinforecements nor harm the japanese warships nor transports.
consider this report from winter jan' to march '43, "our growing air power hammered Kiska and Japanese shipping whenever the severe winter weather would permit." that coulda been done in june with no problem of winter weather... if they woulda "grown" the air power immediately for american strategic needs instead of prioritizing british solomon. what the bleep did roosvelt dnc want? more money for selling weapons to brits? those weapons were needed in alaska. only after alaska was safe can he help others. this is not a "monday morning quarterback" because even the late scout plane, late by 3 days, found the jap navy in june 11 that was when they were informed. yet the america hater roosvelt waited nine MONTHS as above.
we can see the harmful decisions to advance slowly westward instead of using the experienced forces and sending more to "grow" and to expel jap from the aleutians and "hammer jap shipping" that came to strengthen it during june july and august until a "pre-winter" liberation.
imagine what a map of jap occupation would look like if attu were liberated. instead of a line from kiska to gilbert, as truly in june '42, the u.s. could immediately liberate gilberts, in january 42 with warplanes for u.s. needs to push away from hawaii instead of for doomed ships in submarine zone dooming american sailors to death due to brits not patrol Atlantic from 1940 for two years of negligence and later when the alaska threat started. to act in august attu
the line would be from kurile south and then east from southern kyushu across iwo jima to marshal. instead they allowed japs in aleutian to strengthen as above thousands in august and more later.
on 26 march '43, by alaska time, the navy tried to sink some jap reinforcements in transports, but then "went west"??? chasing the jap cruisers south and west instead of the reinforcements. who decided that? what if the jap cruisers would continue escorting the transports called maru and called ap and ak.
what about radar? radar showed the jap cruisesrs moving south so chase the transports north... while unprotected. what about the alaskan defense bombers added until march they could bomb the separate transports.
dumb dem roosvelt harmed u.s. and knew needed to classify these bad harmful tactical choices.
the battle was nine degrees west from kiska and 600 miles west from adak, in al'. that was where the warplanes were despite taking am' in january. omg. good strategy would be to patrol the isles and prevent arrival not go far away.
anyway on the morning of march 26 alaska time, the u.s. navy damaged a jap cruiser. they damaged a u.s. cruiser. victory? no losses of ships.
in aug. '42 u.s. sank one transport and one more in october. in july '43 sank 2 transports.
in contrast battles in july '42 would attract jap reinforcement transports which could be hammered by land based and carriers based warplanes many not only 4 transports per year.
the bad strategy was waiting until The Invasion of Kiska 15 August 1943.
admittedly they liberated the west edge sooner but as above that was after wrongly waiting a year for japs to bring more soldiers and dig defenses. kiska nearer to alaska waited until over a year of occupation.
all this time actiivty was just a bit of solomon isles which halped brit colony while allowing japs in aleution to strengthen... except for gilbert in end of nov. 22, 1942 and marshal in end feb 1943 during this waiting period all four delayed recklessly with harmful and even shockingly long waits.
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